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1 
Corporate Civic Responsibility and the Ownership Agenda: 
Investing in the Public Good 
 
This article seeks to provoke broader public discussion about ways in which human and ecologic 
dignity, prosperity, and the civic ideal can be advanced through a revitalized and principled 
ownership agenda that features greater levels of corporate accountability and civic virtue. It 
draws from portions of what then was called an “Occasional Paper,” part of a series emanating 
from the early days of the University of Massachusetts Boston’s McCormack Graduate School of 
Policy and Global Studies. Written in 1994, it introduces a new paradigm for corporate 
governance called the “corporate covenant,” which casts ownership within the framework of 
citizenship. These “owner citizens” are in a position to influence corporate decision making and 
reduce public cynicism regarding corporate behavior. The article provides a brief overview of 
the history of the corporation and U.S. corporate governance (including corporate 
philanthropy), which illustrates some of the precedents for balancing claims to private and 
public prosperity. It touches on recent theological, corporate governance, and management 
literature in examining these ideas. It summarizes the views expressed in structured interviews 
conducted with fourteen individuals with considerable expertise in relevant areas (including 
shareholder activism, theology, state and local pension and endowment fund management, 
corporate operations, financial investing, and the practice of law). It concludes by highlighting 
some of the implications of the corporate covenant paradigm for shareholders, boards of 
directors, and management; business education; and public administration and social policy. It 
does this by identifying three problem areas warranting the attention of the covenantal promise: 
(1) education; (2) emerging democracies; and (3) the city. 
__________________________________________________________________  
 
Introduction 
This Occasional Paper makes the argument that corporations have a fundamental role to play in 
making a positive contribution to public life, particularly in this era of interdependent global 
economic activity. This assertion is grounded in the assumption that private interest and public 
interest are not mutually exclusive and can be balanced, with civic moral values serving as the 
connective tissue. The paramount questions are, How shall we live? and What should we do? 
Discovered in the course of ongoing dialogue and debate and consistent with democratic 
principles, the integration of financial and nonfinancial values can help to advance a good 
society, part of an evolutionary pattern that restores some of the historic expectations about 
corporate civic obligation. This integration also can help to erase artificial distinctions among the 
profit, nonprofit, and public sectors with respect to responsibility for a prosperous democratic 
society. 
Doing this is grounded in the reality of a dramatically changing ownership universe, wherein 
almost half the equity in major U.S. corporations is held by a handful of large institutional 
investors, representing hundreds of thousands of Americans from many walks of life.  
 
Selections from Corporate Civic Responsibility and the Ownership Agenda: Investing in the Public Good (Boston: 
McCormack Institute of Public Affairs, University of Massachusetts Boston, 1994). 
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These institutional investors do not buy and sell stock as actively as they once did; they are too 
big to do so and tend to hang on to their stock for the long term. They are a permanent as well as 
a diverse lot. Resembling a Coke ad more than a country club, the lives of these owner-citizens 
are affected not only by stock price value but by quality of life considerations, by civic value—
whether or not their streets are safe, their population is literate, and their air is clean. Some of 
these owner-citizens are also employees of the companies in which they own shares; there, too, 
their needs are multiple (and sometimes in conflict), covering categories that cannot always be 
explained in actuarial or financial terms. 
This alteration in the ownership universe, coupled with concerns about corporate 
competitiveness in a global market, has led to a slow but sure power shift in American corporate 
governance away from management and toward owners and their board representatives. The 
resulting reconfiguration of the roles and relationships of investors, boards, and management 
have momentous implications for public policy, public administration, and business education. A 
critical one is the restoration of a public service dimension to the stewardship role as corporate 
boards become the fulcrum through which owner and management authority, as well as civic and 
private good, are exercised. 
 
The King Is Dead 
On August 6, 1993, the nine outside directors of Eastman Kodak Co. announced the dismissal of 
Kay R. Whitmore, chairman, president, and chief executive officer. The sixty-one-year-old 
chairman agreed to stay with the company until a replacement was found; on October 27, Kodak 
named George M. C. Fisher, chairman of Motorola Inc., as its new leader. This was a move that 
surprised Wall Street, because Fisher had successfully guided Motorola through a period of 
explosive growth and record profitability and was not expected to leave the company.
1
 In 
addition to Fisher’s impressive professional qualifications, a major part of his appeal to the 
Kodak board was the fact that he came from outside the ranks of current Kodak management and 
therefore would not engage in what many perceive as a deeply ingrained paternalistic attitude at 
Kodak’s Rochester, New York headquarters. 
Among the reasons publicly cited for Kay Whitmore’s ouster were: (1) the need to move 
swiftly on cost-cutting measures, including layoffs affecting 20,000 of Kodak’s 132,000 
employees worldwide and the sale of various business entities, including its chemical business 
and parts of the Sterling Winthrop drug unit. For some time, Kodak has been under significant 
pressure from investors to trim its $9.5 billion in debt, gained in part by the company’s cash 
acquisition five years ago of Sterling Drug for $5.1 billion, which was widely considered as 
overpriced.
2
 (Sterling was acquired in a friendly takeover in 1988 in the course of events 
described more completely in another Occasional Paper.
3
); (2) the need to put forward a potent 
turnaround plan by September 1993, including a strategy for leading the company’s several 
businesses into the future as well as a set of ideas for expanding Kodak’s business into promising 
product areas; (3) unfavorable results in spite of massive spending on research and development; 
and (4) board dissatisfaction with Whitmore’s performance, even after two years of candid 
discussion and the appointment last November of a special committee charged with overseeing 
him. 
Twelve days after his dismissal, Kodak announced that 10,000 jobs would be eliminated 
throughout the company by 1995, a move that was part of Whitmore’s restructuring plan but not 
considered to be strong enough.
4
 Further cuts are expected, which is sending shock waves 
through the town of Rochester, where one-third of the company’s workforce resides.  
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Ever since George Eastman introduced photography to the masses in 1888, Rochester has 
been the recipient of Kodak largesse, both as paternalistic employer and as longtime community 
benefactor. Kay Whitmore’s reluctance to fire people stems from this corporate tradition, a 
stance that ran afoul, however, of shareholder and board beliefs that greater efforts must be taken 
to keep Kodak a strong company. Even though Rochester has maintained its position as a leading 
manufacturing center and is no longer a “one-company town” like Buffalo or Ypsilanti—many 
smaller companies have sprung up in the area, often started by former Kodak employees—
several community leaders are fearful of the prospect of new, outside management and the 
possibility that jobs could be moved to parts of the world with lower wage rates. They wonder, 
too, if Kodak’s corporate philanthropy programs will continue. Rochester’s superintendent cites 
Kodak’s program—spearheaded by Kay Whitmore and sending 750 employees into classrooms 
from kindergarten through high school—as an example of the company’s commitment to 
improving education and the future work force. Local observers wonder who will win the clash 
of values, with Wall Street on the one side and the corporate/community relationship on the 
other.
5
 
A chemical engineer by training, Whitmore was a thirty-five year veteran of Kodak, 
working his way up through the photographic film business and becoming president in 1983, 
succeeding Colby Chandler as chairman and chief executive officer in June, 1990. While 
president of Kodak, Whitmore was the chief negotiator with Sterling Drug in its takeover of 
Sterling in February 1988. His departure is significant because it represents another in a series of 
major management changes in American companies made within the past year that were forced 
by outside directors and institutional investors, particularly public pension funds. The chairmen 
of General Motors Corp., IBM, Westinghouse Electric Corp., Eli Lilly & Co., Digital Equipment 
Corporation, Sears Roebuck and Co., Salomon Brothers, and American Express were sacked as a 
result of shareholder dissatisfaction with financial performance.
6
 In contrast, Kodak has 
remained profitable, earning $1.14 billion in 1992 on sales of $20.2 billion.
7
 Kodak directors, 
however, considered this 5.7 percent profit margin as insufficient, stating that they expected 
Whitmore’s successor to do at least twice as well.8 “I’m struck by the importance of what the 
directors of Eastman Kodak have done,” said Robert A. G. Monks, a longtime proponent of 
greater shareholder involvement and corporate accountability (particularly at Kodak), quoted in a 
New York Times report. “This is a great day for the American shareholder.”9 
Kodak’s largest institutional shareholder, Fidelity Investment, was also extremely 
disgruntled with Kodak’s performance. Playing a quiet behind the scenes role, Fidelity made 
known its unhappiness to Whitmore, particularly after the sudden resignation of a new chief 
financial officer who was brought in to turn the company around.
10
 Traditionally, financial 
intermediaries such as mutual funds and money managers are reluctant to directly influence 
corporate policy. The entry into corporate affairs of the nation’s largest shareholder (Fidelity 
holds $92 billion in common stocks), only this time a money manager rather than a pension fund, 
demonstrates that yet another boundary has been broken in pursuit of shareholder rights. 
Last but most certainly not least, the world’s largest pension plan, the $127 billion Teachers 
Insurance and Annuity Association-College Retirement Equities Fund (TIAA-CREF), recently 
announced its corporate governance policy.
11
 TIAA-CREF holds $52 billion in stocks and 
believes that its new policy, which involves greater pressure on corporate boards to have a 
majority of independent directors, will lead to better corporate performance and higher stock 
prices. TIAA-CREF also was an invisible player in the Kodak conflict, trying to get about 20 
other major pension funds to vote against three of Kodak’s directors who were running for re-
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election.
12
 Traditionally, TIAA-CREF has not been active in pursuing shareholder aims; its 
recent decision is expected to contribute greatly to the growing power and influence of 
institutional investors. 
 
Corporate Governance and Control: The New Order 
No longer immune to shareholder demands and outside pressures, corporate kingdoms are 
undergoing a power shift of seismic proportions.
13
 Big owners—that is, institutional investors 
holding substantial blocks of stock over a long time period—can now wield authority in ways 
that have important implications for managerial capitalism and, eventually, corporate civic 
responsibility. The heightened awareness and involvement of directors and institutional 
shareholders in corporate decision making mark a new chapter in the history of American 
corporate governance, although it evokes an earlier era in which the ownership and managerial 
role were interconnected. 
At stake here, however, is not just how corporations are governed and managed—the current 
preoccupation of players and pundits—but what kind of role they are to play in society and how 
they comport themselves, both internally and externally. The potential consequences for public 
life are enormous because corporate resources—human, technological, and financial—are so 
vast. The extent to which the shifting power base of corporate authority can contribute to a better 
balance between self-interest and the public interest has ramifications for how we tackle 
stubborn social problems heretofore the sole subject of governmental and nonprofit intervention. 
A major reason this development is taking place is because, paradoxically, the corporate 
ownership universe is both expanding and contracting. Institutional investors—such as public 
and private pension funds, endowments, union funds, mutual funds, trust funds, employee stock 
ownership plans (ESOPs), and foundations—now own almost half of corporate America. 
This makes the ownership profile look more like a Coke ad than a country club because 
beneficiaries and other constituents of these investors represent a cross-section of the American 
public: They are a diverse lot, representing a rich mix of racial, ethnic, and cultural traditions. 
They are owner-citizens, concerned about return on their investment but also concerned about the 
quality of life in their neighborhoods and whether or not their future looks bright. They want 
safety and security, not just with investment holdings but also within their communities. They 
are concerned about values, both the economic kind and the moral kind. Some owner-citizens are 
also employees, so they are concerned not only with profit but with the quality of worklife. 
Taken together, they represent an untapped power base, but probably have no real idea of the 
potential influence they could have on corporate policy and operations or the ways in which they 
can help promote a good society and a better world. 
But even as the ownership universe expands, reflecting a diverse group of all sorts of people, 
it also contracts, resulting in a concentration of clout that changes the custom of royal managerial 
prerogative. For example, the top thirty pension funds and money managers own huge hunks of 
the nation’s largest corporations, a trend that is expected to increase.14 Most big institutional 
owners hang on to their equity holdings in large companies for long periods of time; they do not 
engage in rapid turnover of stocks because buying and selling is expensive and satisfactory 
results can be achieved through indexing. Some of these so-called “patient investors” or 
“permanent owners” recognize the ramifications of their position and are thus playing a more 
active role in corporate oversight and strategy. However, as they gain the keys to the kingdom, 
they have yet to fully realize their potential for assuring that what companies do is in both the 
public as well as their own best interest. 
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Put another way, the shifting power base in American firms from entrenched management to 
shareholder concerns opens the door for fuller integration of nonfinancial principles and values, 
of civic moral values, into the very fiber of corporate being, a development that literally and 
figuratively can add value to existing forms of corporate enterprise. They may sound quaint but 
included here are respect for human and ecologic dignity, freedom, equality, fairness, justice, 
compassion, truth, tolerance, representation, peace of mind, due process, beauty and pleasure, 
personal and institutional responsibility, and so on. Instead of segregating these values, as is 
typically the case to an office of community and public affairs, to a corporate code of conduct, to 
workshops on business ethics, or to advertising copy and glossy annual reports, they can be 
viewed as nourishing all of these activities within the embracive context of corporate character. 
They also can animate creative discussion and action concerning what companies can contribute 
to public life. Thus they become traits that not only enhance the quality of corporate performance 
but join this performance to the needs of human community, the requirements of a pluralist 
democracy, and the important challenges of our time. 
 
A New Paradigm 
Shareholder and director concerns, then, about corporate governance, driven by a desire to make 
companies more accountable and profitable, can also begin to address the larger issue of 
corporate civic values and responsibility, of corporate citizenship, far beyond the patterns set in 
the past few decades. The relationship between a corporation and society is interdependent, the 
health and prosperity of one bearing upon the health and prosperity of the other. 
That is why we need a paradigm for thinking about the corporation in ways that integrate 
economic and civic moral values. This is an important insight, especially in an era marked by 
global interdependence and the fall of the nation state, wherein the multinational corporation in 
particular can have a profound effect on a society’s economic, social, and political development 
and well-being. 
By what authority can such a claim be made? And, to what aim is this claim directed? The 
basis for asserting the need to change the paradigm with which we view the business corporation 
has multiple roots: in the history of the corporate form, in the teachings of some of the world’s 
great religions, and in the practical necessities of a world that simultaneously has become more 
united and divided, a world where human suffering of absolutely unspeakable proportions 
coexists, be it in Bosnia or our own backyard, with life-enhancing scientific and technological 
breakthroughs occurring at a dizzying pace. The authoritative basis, then, for positing the view 
that corporations need to be more vitally and constructively engaged in public life stems from a 
moral and economic imperative which can be described in both secular and theological terms. 
The aim is both simple and complicated: a good life and a good society, where “good” can 
mean many different things and where the notion of society is pluralistic. Indeed, at one level, 
multinational corporations have special knowledge of these different definitions of “the good 
life” as they attempt to market their products worldwide; they have learned that what is popular 
in one part of the world may be a dud in another. 
Meant here, however, are not the “goods and services” of a good society. Meant here are the 
values with which a good society defines and sustains itself, the principles by which it lives and 
is prepared to make sacrifices, the legacy it passes on to future generations. Corporations, like 
other major institutions, play a role in this social, economic, and spiritual definition. 
In developing the good society, in seeking the common-wealth, perhaps now is the time to  
leave behind artificial distinctions among sectors—public/private, profit/non-profit, 
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governmental/non-governmental—and pursue a course where responsibility for and engagement 
in our public life is deepened and strengthened across the board, by all sectors. And perhaps now 
is the time for corporations to shoulder a greater share of the civic burden and, in so doing, join 
the chorus of calling forth the better angels of our nature and the prospects for a better world. 
 
Shareholder versus Stakeholder Values 
Many American companies express concerns about social and environmental responsibility 
through corporate philanthropy. However well-intended, these concerns are often episodic and 
not fully integrated into corporate mission, strategy, and culture. For example, some firms are 
heavily engaged in efforts designed to improve American public education because they 
recognize that doing so affects their future bottom line, as well as the state of the nation. While 
laudable, such actions are likely to be sidelined when a company is undergoing major 
restructuring or when there is a drop in profits because they are seen as marginal to the central 
corporate mission, which is to enhance shareholder value. 
Nota bene: “Shareholder value” is the commonly used term to describe what corporations 
should be doing. One wonders how the phrase might be reworked to have moral meaning, to 
denote the “values of the shareholder,” so that “shareholder value” would refer to “shareholder 
dignity,” “shareholder peace of mind,” “shareholder liberty,” and so forth, as well as 
“shareholder economic prosperity.” 
Sometimes corporate good works are designed more for public relations or marketing 
purposes than they are the byproduct of deeply felt convictions or beliefs; while many may 
dispute this “means-end” test to civic responsibility, market motives provide an unstable source 
of meaning and can easily lead to corporate philanthropy dominated by the trends and tastes of 
the time. 
Another popular way American companies define their social responsibility mission is in 
terms of their obligation to so-called “stakeholder” populations: that is, the range of groups with 
a stake in the company’s operations, such as employees, customers, shareholders, suppliers and 
vendors, and the community at large.
15
 These, too, are admirable realizations of a company’s role 
that stretch its vision and values beyond immediate self-interest. 
The problem, however, with the stakeholder approach to civic responsibility is the same sort 
of problem that bedevils contemporary political life: It reduces the corporate role to a series of 
bargains and trade-offs negotiated with particular special interest groups, absent the connective 
tissue of a philosophy, ethic, or mechanism that mobilizes moral and physical energy in pursuit 
of a broader public good. Stakeholder responsibility is special interest group responsibility and, 
ipso facto, atomistic and episodic. Often missing from this approach is an overriding vision of 
the greater good and the civic ideal, described in both financial and nonfinancial terms, which 
give life to corporate activity in the first place. 
 
The 400-Year View: Shifting Sands of Civic Concern 
The idea of private activity in the public interest may seem idealistic to some or even irrelevant 
to others but it is a phenomenon with a long and noble history. Within the United States, only 
within the past one hundred years or so has the view that “the business of business is business” 
been paramount, saturated with financial indicators and characterized by firmly entrenched and 
autonomous corporate management. 
Nevertheless, from the colonial era through the mid-nineteenth century, American business 
ownership and management were interrelated, with owner/managers more intimately connected 
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to and active in the communities in which they lived. Indeed, the chartering process itself 
involved the idea of reciprocal obligation to society. 
But from the 1860s on, as industrialization occurred and business got bigger, ownership 
became dispersed, with stockholders playing an increasingly distant and passive role in corporate 
affairs. By contrast, managers played an increasingly active one, in the process insulating 
themselves from oversight and accountability.
16
 The primary recourse for dissatisfied 
shareholders was to sell their shares—the so-called “Wall Street Walk”—thereby sending an 
indirect message to management that change was needed. The subsequent schism between 
owners and managers and lopsided form of control came to dominate American corporate 
governance for the next 130 years. 
By the turn of the century, as corporations grew in size and complexity, the public viewed 
them with increasing suspicion, especially insofar as contributing to social well-being. Business 
success became defined in strictly private and economic terms, with civic needs or public 
obligations relegated to the realms of state and local government, nonprofit organizations, or 
individual acts of charity. The notion that economic life is embedded within a moral/political 
foundation was completely rejected. Instead of viewing corporate behavior as immersed in a 
series of relations among persons and permeated by their moral and political norms, the company 
was viewed as a fully functioning, self-contained unit operating in the shadow of public space, 
driven only by its desire to survive and maximize profits. 
Within the past thirty-five years more vigorous calls for managerial accountability have 
been issued by shareholders, part of a pattern of rising levels of outside corporate scrutiny which 
have found expression in different ways. Concerns about corporate social responsibility in the 
1960s and 1970s represent one approach to corporate monitoring and oversight. The emergence 
in the 1970s and 1980s of tough global competitors, especially Japanese and German firms 
wherein ownership and management are closely held and dominated by banks, represents 
another.
17
 
A third approach to oversight occurred throughout the 1970s, when greater attention was 
paid to the role, composition, and liability of boards of directors so that accountability and 
performance could be improved. 
But perhaps the most visible (and controversial) mode of oversight gained prominence in the 
1980s, when managerial discipline took the form of a market-based method for corporate 
control: the hostile takeover. Hostile takeovers were fueled, in part, by the easy money policy of 
the Federal Reserve, which produced liquidity in the banking system making vast amounts of 
credit available to takeover specialists. They were also animated by government regulatory 
policies—particularly the relaxation of antitrust law implementation—which threw the airline, 
banking, and telecommunications industries into turmoil. 
Like medieval warriors, aggressive investors dubbed “corporate raiders” sought unfriendly 
control of large companies by purchasing unaffiliated stock (a practice called “sweeping the 
street”), negotiating to buy “friendly” blocks of shares, and launching simultaneous proxy 
contests for control of a board. They justified their acquisition activities with the charge that 
managements ran companies for their own benefit and that improved performance and 
shareholder value could only be realized through a takeover. 
Takeover activity peaked in the late 1980s and we are now in its wake, although in the past 
few months there has been a resurgence in mergers and takeovers, driven primarily by higher 
stock prices (which serve to finance the deals) and rapid changes in certain industries, 
particularly in health care and telecommunications. This recent spate is notably represented by 
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last year’s acquisition by Merck & Co. of Medco Cost Containment Services Inc. and Columbia 
Healthcare Corp.’s acquisition of HCA-Hospital Corporation of America; AT&T’s acquisition of 
McCaw Cellular Communications Corp., the attempted acquisition of Tele-Communications Inc. 
by Bell Atlantic Corp., and the takeover battle for Paramount Communications Inc. eventually 
won by Viacom Inc. against QVC Network Inc. 
Yet in spite of the new merger boom, generally speaking, according to John Pound, 
associate professor of public policy and director of the Corporate Voting Research Project at 
Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government, the pendulum has swung back to a “political” model 
of corporate oversight. This model is based not just upon the proxy resolution voting process but 
also upon the myriad ongoing, informal shareholder activities designed to communicate their 
concerns and hold management accountable, including the use of private negotiation, public 
lobbying, shareholder campaigns, and so on. In contrast to the relatively undemocratic style of 
the takeover model, the political model of corporate oversight better fits within the American 
democratic tradition of due process, informed public debate, and negotiation and compromise.
18
 
Pound says there are two primary forces contributing to the reassertion of this more political 
approach: (1) the collapse of corporate takeovers, particularly hostile ones, due to changes in 
corporate law and corporate charters as well as public disenchantment, all of which tended to 
protect special interest groups and nullify hostile attempts at corporate control; and (2) a 
dramatic transformation in the ownership universe, with its increasingly higher concentration of 
equity ownership among a relatively few number of institutions possessing the power and, for 
some, the will to influence corporate behavior. Thus the 1990s scenario is one in which owners 
and their board-elected representatives are reappropriating a much more proactive stance 
concerning fiduciary responsibility and corporate conduct. They are also gaining more leverage 
over the executives and managers of the corporate world. 
“There’s been a huge shift in power within companies,” according to Ralph Whitworth, 
president of United Shareholders Association (USA), an investors’ advocacy group co-founded 
by T. Boone Pickens based in Washington, D.C. USA recently folded up its operations, claiming 
that it had accomplished what it set out to do in getting companies to be more cooperative. 
“We’re seeing things move in the direction of major structural and managerial change.”19 One 
byproduct of this realignment is greater direct communication between corporate managers and 
major institutional shareholders on topics traditionally off-limits, such as corporate strategy 
concerning business acquisitions or divestitures or on what new enterprises to launch. This 
phenomenon has been dubbed “relationship investing,” a term coined by Ira Millstein, a well-
known corporate governance expert at New York’s Weil, Gotshal & Manges and consultant to 
outside directors at General Motors, Westinghouse, and IBM; Mr. Millstein is also chairman of 
the Board of Advisors to Columbia Law School’s Institutional Investor Project. “Relationship 
investing,” he writes, “[is] investing in substantial long-term positions in blocks of stock 
sufficient to motivate the shareholder to monitor corporate performance knowledgeably and to be 
prepared to influence corporate strategy and governance based on a perception of 
performance.”20 
As stated earlier, the reconfiguration of the powers, roles, and relationships among 
institutional investors and corporate boards and management have momentous implications that 
go beyond both the board room and bottom line and into the realm of civic values, public well-
being, and social policy. For some time, institutional responsibility for public life has been 
mistakenly viewed as the chief province of entities other than business, such as government, 
nonprofit organizations, or, indirectly, academe. But given the high degree of interdependence 
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between the governance and operations of a corporation and the society in which it exists, 
current changes in corporate oversight and management present the opportunity to reexamine 
assumptions not only about the role and responsibility of the corporation, its board, and its 
owners within a single, integrated global market but also within a broader civic moral context. In 
other words, changes in American corporate governance and control can provoke thoughtful 
reconsideration and discussion of the interplay between mercantile values and civic moral 
values, of the need to think about the accumulation of wealth not merely as advancing private 
prosperity but the common-wealth or common good as well. 
 
Covenantal Capitalism 
This article advances the idea of a corporate covenant—that is, a voluntary corporate 
commitment to a set of civic moral principles and ideals which serve as a sort of North Star, thus 
guiding action but also translating into an operative foundation for internal and external 
institutional behavior. The corporate covenant represents a public promise to advance human and 
environmental good, made by owners and their representatives and thereby binding the 
covenanted people—corporate owners, directors, employees, customers, vendors, and 
contractors—to certain values which are not static but become amplified and strengthened over 
time. 
As such, the covenant is transcendent, acknowledging the primary purpose of the 
corporation yet moving beyond the immediate needs and claims of the stakeholder populations, 
coursing throughout various corporate units and offices, and providing an image of the future 
grounded in civic moral ideals. 
It is not negotiated but becomes defined in terms of conduct; it is mediated by corporate 
charters and by-laws, by strategic plans and organizational behavior; and it acknowledges the 
ever-present (and oftentimes contradictory) tension between the demands of a moral imperative, 
on the one side, and the complex and changing demands of democratic capitalism, on the other. 
The moral principles embodied by the corporate covenant—which may include respect for 
human and ecologic dignity, freedom or liberty, justice, truth, and so on—serve as the standards 
by which the corporation is judged and the degree to which the public promise is fulfilled. 
Central to the covenant is the idea of mutual obligation and service in the giving and receiving of 
the promise. In other words, by voluntarily committing itself to the promise of the covenant, the 
corporation receives the benefits of the human and environmental good it purports to advance. 
Such a paradigm shift for thinking about the corporation has implications for shareholders, 
financial intermediaries, boards, and management because it reinvigorates the notion of 
trusteeship or stewardship, reconnecting it to a powerful public service dimension that challenges 
traditional religious doctrines of sacrifice or suffering. It also challenges current interpretations 
of prudency and fiduciary responsibility, interpretations which tend to focus narrowly on the 
duty and care exhibited in achieving immediate financial gains to a shareholder without 
attending to the quality of life context in which the shareholder or beneficiary exists.
21
 
The challenge, therefore, is to link legal and conventional assumptions about duty, care, 
loyalty, and prudence as applied to private property to concepts which also advance a broader 
public good. Parenthetically, attention could also be paid to how these traditional virtues 
associated with fiduciary responsibility may, in fact, serve to undermine the broader public good, 
such as when excessive risk avoidance impedes progress and prosperity.
22
  
There are three primary areas where the covenantal paradigm can be applied to institutional 
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and individual behavior: 
 Within the realm of ownership policies. These include the values, objectives, 
strategic plans, and needs of institutional investors; their mode of 
communicating their value-based criteria and concerns; how they recognize and 
reconcile their own diversity and multiple role demands and expectations (for 
instance, as shareholders, beneficiaries, citizens, managers, or employees); and 
the nature and substance of their civic obligation (that is, the types of 
commitments or concessions they are willing to make); 
 Within the realm of the board of directors. Included here is an articulation of its 
stewardship ethic; the financial and nonfinancial values and principles that 
guide its decision making; its composition, representation, responsiveness, and 
expertise; the nature of its process of orientation and education, deliberation, 
and communication; and the way in which it evaluates its performance and 
whether or not it fulfills its stewardship mission; and  
 Within the realm of organizational behavior. This covers the expression, in 
practical terms, of mission, values, and quality standards; a company’s modes 
of decision making, representation, and participation; methods of 
compensation, recognition, and dispute resolution; policies and practices with 
respect to environmental stewardship, corporate philanthropy, community 
service, and public interest partnerships or joint ventures; accountability 
structures and levels of disclosure; and institutional self-assessment and 
corrective measures.  
To varying degrees, each of these areas is, of course, the subject of activity in various 
professional fields. However, these realms to be treated more systematically as parts of a unified 
whole, each of them being partners in an enterprise which has far-reaching economic, political, 
and social consequences. Key here is the idea of coherence and faith in making good on the 
covenant rather than engaging in disjointed or disconnected efforts. The covenant serves to unify 
complex and highly differentiated institutional activities in a manner that advances a whole 
company on the path toward the civic ideal without getting picked apart by special interests. 
A special word: I urge caution in this discussion, as terms like “civic virtue” and “the 
common good” have a dark underbelly and are sometimes used as a justification for cultural 
oppression or military valor and victory.
23
 Even worse is the temptation to dichotomize civic 
virtue and the common good into “we-they” terms, often through mobilized opposition to other 
nations or peoples, something we see throughout the world as well in our nation’s cities. Indeed, 
within a post-Cold War context, wherein the traditional rivalries among nation states have 
ended—and perhaps even with the decline of the nation state itself, in the light of the conflicting 
pulls of tribalism and globalism, among others—and are replaced, as Samuel P. Huntington 
points out, by conflicts between different civilizations with religion at the heart of these conflicts, 
terms like “virtue” and “good” need to be handled with care.24 
We need to find our way between moral tyranny and moral relativism, all the while 
acknowledging the possibility that there is an intuitive moral sense human beings possess. Two 
of our more gifted commentators, Robert Coles and James Q. Wilson, come to this conclusion in 
their recent books. In The Call of Service: A Witness to Idealism, Robert Coles examines 
idealism as a deeply human impulse and explores its nature, at a time when the nation, 
particularly its youth, seems once again to be heeding the call of social activism.
25
 He identifies 
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different kinds of service—expressed in social and political struggle, community service, 
through personal gestures and encounters, charity, religiously sanctioned action, government-
sanctioned action, and service to country—and describes some of the satisfactions and 
consequences such service sets in motion. With dozens of vignettes, Coles paints an eloquent 
picture of how the call to service is not only a call toward others—heart, mind, and soul—but 
also “a call inward, a call to oneself, a call that is a reminder: ‘Watchman, what of the night?’. . . 
. the darkness that defines the moment of light in us, the darkness that challenges us to shine for 
one another before, soon enough, we join it.”26 
No less a moral philosopher than Alasdair MacIntyre, whose own brilliant work lays out the 
discouraging claim that our current society cannot come to moral agreement because we are 
dealing with rival and incommensurable moral premises, praises James Q. Wilson’s The Moral 
Sense for its ability to synthesize a range of social science inquiry—including psychological, 
sociological, and anthropological—in answering the question of what constitutes the core, if 
there is one, of basic moral attitudes and beliefs.
27
 
In Wilson’s view, there are four areas in which humans share basic moral attitudes and 
beliefs, including how we exercise sympathy, fairness, self-control, and regard for duty. These, 
he says, are necessary to character and human excellence and are exhibited in local practices and 
relationships, particularly friends, family and social groupings.
28
 Both Coles and Wilson 
contribute to an understanding of how, on a broader scale, certain virtues are essential in order to 
begin to address the question of a common good. 
Our world needs definitions of civic virtue and the common good—or better yet, valid 
processes for arriving at such definitions—which can be used as the basis for coherent 
institutional and individual behavior. Our public discourse needs to include what is important to 
us, what values we hold dear, as defined within a pluralist context marked by different racial, 
cultural, ethnic, religious, and economic traditions.
29
 Given this dynamic reality, perhaps a better 
way of thinking about “civic virtue” and the “common good” is to think of them as an 
assemblage of goods and virtues, oftentimes overlapping and sometimes contradictory, with each 
having a place within the different spheres of human existence but none representing some 
casuistic, absolute standard of goodness—because the absolute version of the full human good is 
transcendent, beyond human hands. 
 
A Paradigm for Practice: The Corporate Covenant and the Commonwealth 
How, then, might a corporation be viewed as a moral agent, conducting its affairs as seen through 
the lens of civic virtue? How might the content of its character be defined and judged? Indeed, 
how might the better side of its nature be magnified? The corporate covenant paradigm draws 
upon three realms of experience and expertise. 
First is the role of religion and philosophy. Throughout the past several years, there has been 
a spate of interest and activity concerning how religiously based principles and convictions, 
particularly those emanating from the Christian tradition, might apply to economic enterprise. 
This whole area is ripe for further investigation and discussion, and should include the ways in 
which other religious traditions address financial and economic concerns. Virtually all the 
world's great religions address the topic somehow. Missing are vehicles for understanding these 
teachings and how they might apply to contemporary corporate and investment realities. 
Second, a review of the history of the corporate form reveals how the public-private 
pendulum of prosperity has shifted back and forth over the centuries. Most recently, this is 
manifest through corporate philanthropy and voluntarism. What remains, however, is public 
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ambivalence (at best) or downright cynicism (at worst) concerning the capacity of corporations 
to fulfill their civic obligations. 
Third, the views and insights of knowledgeable individuals are put forward, based upon a 
series of structured interviews on the topic of corporations and their civic moral responsibilities. 
Each of these parties is a prominent player within their respective professional realms, which 
include public pension funds, theology, endowment management, corporate management, and 
financial investment. All of those who were interviewed acknowledged the relatively uncharted 
nature of this endeavor and its significance in a rapidly changing world marked by increasing 
levels of interdependence. By and large they found the concept of the corporate covenant a 
provocative one, drawing together a number of elements in a manner that invites rather than 
repels further conversation and reflection. 
The paradigm of a corporate covenant constitutes a different kind of “relationship investing” 
that represents a collective conditional commitment between a corporation and society to a set of 
civic and environmental ideals, a commitment that is mutually agreed to, voluntary, periodically 
renewed, and aimed at a form of “interdependent prosperity” and the larger public good. 30 Put 
simply, the corporate covenant is a deal (but not like the investment banking kind), a promise 
held by owners and citizens which acknowledges the complex web of interdependence and 
reciprocal influence, of giving and receiving—for after all, all owners are citizens, even though 
not all citizens are owners, or even employees. In contrast to a contractual relationship, which 
can be broken or renegotiated, tends to be past- and present-oriented, is dominated by rules and 
focused on compliance and avoiding injury, a covenantal relationship recognizes the need for 
different levels of accountability and is forward-looking, aimed at a more desirable state of being 
which is governed by civic moral ideals. Its essence is affirmative and grounded in faith, fidelity, 
and trust; it unfolds under the tension between promise and fulfillment. In contrast, the 
contractual relationship is proscriptive and based on fear and suspicion; it unfolds under the 
tension between skepticism and security. 
 
Covenantal Capitalism and the Civic Ethic 
For corporations, the paradigm of a covenantal relationship has parallel meaning. It presumes a 
covenanted people—a corporation’s owners, directors, employees, customers, vendors and 
contractors—bound to civic ideals that are mediated by corporate charters and by-laws and 
translated into workable principles, with corporate structure and management able to absorb the 
lessons of corporate experience and take account of unbridled human passions, such as boundless 
greed, bloodthirsty competition, or excessive risk-taking. Given the shift in the power base from 
managers to owners, shareholders, especially large institutional shareholders, are in a position as 
citizens and as owners—and perhaps even as employees—to be open, on the one side, to a civic 
moral covenant and, on the other, to the comprehensive and ever-changing demands of 
democratic capitalism. 
Across the Atlantic, Sir Adrian Cadbury of Cadbury Schweppes and the Bank of England is 
all for the idea of the corporate covenant, which coincides with much of his own work with 
respect to corporate management and governance. Cadbury’s convictions and business practices 
are rooted in an English Quaker tradition, where attitudes toward wealth and public 
responsibility are permeated by values such as service, freedom, and dignity, and represent a 
powerful fusion of education, pragmatism, and idealism. 
The relationship between a corporation and society is a paramount Cadbury concern, 
expressed in his award-winning Harvard Business Review article on ethical managers and more 
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recently in his book The Company Chairman and the Cadbury Code of Best Practice.
31
 “You 
know, I like your covenant, particularly your word ‘reciprocal,’” he says. “I think this is terribly 
important. It’s very easy to look on this as a sort of one-sided thing, but it’s reciprocal.” He then 
continues: 
 
Somewhere in my writing I talk about companies being “licensed”, by operating 
under a license in society. That’s not quite as good a word, but it’s seeking after 
the same thing. And my point about the license was that the terms of the license 
keep on changing. 
At one level, you can say that the covenant could be that you don’t actually 
do anything harmful to the community. The more positive covenant says, “We 
actually believe that it’s in all of our interest to try to help this community to 
advance. The company will advance in line with the community advancing.”  
Now, I find that helpful. At the end of my book The Company Chairman, I’ve 
written a thing called the character of the company, in which I tried to set out 
some view of what I thought was the sort of company that we were. I have used 
that, plus the ethics essay, in going around the company and the world to talk to 
managers and then getting them to argue with me so that we could try and clear 
our minds as to what we were talking about.32 
 
Sir Adrian considers other traits of the corporate covenant to be appealing, such as its 
voluntary and self-evaluation aspects, which in his view reduce the need for government 
regulation. “Of course the state must regulate —that is part of its obligation. But we all recognize 
that regulation is expensive. Second, to a certain degree, it’s inefficient because the regulators 
are operating without being part of the system. And there is also the problem that we must have 
room to innovate, we mustn’t stifle creativity. So it’s in the interest of the community as well as 
the company that self-regulation should be promoted.” 
Turning to the broader challenge of defining “civic good” without supplanting the role of 
government, Sir Adrian then said: 
 
What are the civic implications? If a company sees itself as having a continuing 
relationship with a community or with a country, then it can see advantage for 
itself in involving itself in the community, just the way that your compact 
arrangements in Boston have done between companies and schools. 
A big part of your covenant, I think, is to say, What are areas of common 
interest? Where do we have resources that can supplement what the state is 
doing? It’s not our job to provide education. But, we are, in fact, able to improve 
the chances of the children in school by adding something, so we’re adding value.  
And I think one of the issues here, under this whole category of civic 
implications is, How can we add value without actually turning away from our 
basic purpose of providing goods and services? There are ways in which we can 
help the community, and they actually add value to us, because when it’s our 
people going to the community and helping with the schools, they develop as 
people and they become better managers as a result. I started a thing [in Britain] 
called the Foundation for Education-Business Partnerships and it seems to me a 
clear way in which one can see this. 
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But my definition of the covenant would be that it’s the state’s responsibility 
to provide the educational system and to determine it and everything else. But 
where we can put something on top of that, which is actually going to improve the 
chances of the children in the system—then that seems to me part of the 
community covenant.  
The danger is, which we saw a bit under the government of Mrs. Thatcher, 
was that the state might actually back out of some of its responsibilities and try to 
put them on business or on philanthropy. So I think that it’s quite important that 
we say that both on the nonprofit side and on the business side that what we’re 
doing is adding to what the state should provide, not actually substituting it.
33
 
 
The Rise of Institutional Investors 
A primary challenge for articulating the corporate covenant relates to the growing presence and 
prominence of institutional investors. Sir Adrian, along with David Hollenbach and Max 
Stackhouse, recognize that the moral values of individual shareholders are far more easily 
defined and communicated than those held by institutional owners, but believe that this should 
not be an excuse for remaining silent, however difficult the task. Conscientious reflection and 
dialogue between owners and managers on civic responsibility matters should be promoted. 
“Part of the responsibility of the owners is to come along and make clear what their position 
is,” Sir Adrian says. “But there’s a problem here for institutional investors in knowing what 
those beliefs are. You may be quite clear when you’ve got, for example, an institution which is, 
say, a green investment trust, because you know they have a concern for the environment and 
they want a reasonable rate of return. But you don’t actually know what your institutional 
investors are looking for.” He then turns to the tough question of how best to define institutional 
rather than individual forms of investor civic duty: 
 
I mean, what mixture of return and community service, if you like, are they 
expecting from the company? And if they don’t tell you, how are you to know? 
….We need quite a bit of facilitating, because that kind of discussion does not, at 
the moment, go on between investors and management. What we have to do is to 
encourage more genuine dialogue between investors and boards. At the moment, I 
would say that the owners do not see their responsibility, really, as going much 
further than just keeping an eye on things and selling out if they don’t like the 
look of it. But if we’re talking about ethics and moral values for business, which 
we are, we also need to talk about ethics and moral values for investors. I mean, 
exactly the same applies to them. 
 
Articulating Civic Moral Values 
So what are the most effective methods for knowing and acting upon institutional investors’ 
moral values, convictions, and ethical concerns? Moreover, given the American tradition of 
thinking in more individualistic rather than institutional terms, and given the recent tendency to 
think of “public responsibility” pertaining to only the “public sector”, how do issues related to 
the public interest or the public good become translated into non-governmental institutional 
policy and practice? 
Max Stackhouse, pondering this, states the need for a transformation of consciousness about 
the nature, character, and social responsibility of institutions, of the need to become “systems 
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thinkers”. “Some people are pilgrims and some people are architects,” he says. “That’s a way of 
saying that some people try to find their own personal path in life and find their way through the 
jungle of economic and job and family and other responsibilities. 
 
Pilgrims are a wonderful thing — they’ve got a grand holy history. But at the 
moment I think we need architects who design structures and systems that work, 
wherein people can find their path. I’m using that as a kind of metaphor for the 
need for institutional and structural thinking in this scenario of institutional 
investors. And all the things about the covenant, a lot of the things about the 
corporation, and a lot of the things about the nature and character of 
professionalization, and what a good professional has to be aware of, are deeply 
related to this.
34
 
 
According to Sir Adrian, institutional investors should consider being more publicly explicit 
about what their values and policies are, just as companies are expected to do. He believes that 
one important value is building for the future, a departure from the short-termism so often 
demonstrated by investors. “The lead has got to come from the top,” he says. “The people at the 
top of companies have got to set a pattern. But the people at the top of those pension funds have 
got to set a pattern, too. There’s just as much an obligation on them to think about what they’re 
doing for the community and what their values are as there is for us.” He then points out the need 
for more collaboration and confrontation, to find common ground: 
 
You know, I’m not trying to get at anybody, because we’re all in it together at the 
end of the day. But I think at the moment that the discussion is much too 
adversarial and too little is said about the fact that at the end of the day we are all 
going either to prosper or not prosper. We depend upon each other. 
. . . . The Cadbury family trust, which is based in Birmingham and which I 
am not involved with, produces a detailed annual report of its activities—what 
causes it supports, why it supports them, and what actions result from that 
support. In a sense that’s a clear statement of their objectives as a charitable trust. 
I believe that, just as I think companies should state more clearly what it is 
that they’re about, we ought to have exactly the same from the institutional 
investor. The pension fund ought to produce not just a report that is solely 
concerned with what it has bought and sold in the year, but what it’s trying to do 
and how it has measured up against those goals. 
Now I don’t know about America but that’s certainly not generally the case 
here. I have only seen such reporting in not-for-profit institutions. The Rountree 
Trust is another one which does a very good series of statements of purpose.
35
 
I’m not conscious that pension funds have done this at all, but I don’t see 
how we can get anywhere if we don’t start with that. 
 
Fellow countryman Jonathan Charkham, former Advisor to the Governors of the Bank of 
England, shares the view that ethics and economic activity are linked but does not go so far as to 
speak about a company’s covenantal responsibility. His outlook on corporate morality coincides 
with the stakeholder school: that proper standards of conduct should be maintained in a number 
of key constituent relationships. Although he is reluctant to impose a set of moral beliefs on 
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others — “I don’t think one has any moral right to assume that we have the right to dictate to our 
beneficiaries what their view of the world should be”36—he also thinks it is a fair question to ask. 
“If we [financial intermediaries] are going to take a moral stance, let’s take a moral stance with 
their agreement. Maybe they’ll support us. Why should we treat them as being [anonymous]—
they’re identifiable, they’re askable.” 
Charkham then steps back to reflect upon the changes that have occurred in business, due to 
the financialization of the economy. “I wonder a bit, if I may change the subject, about the 
doctrine of enlightened self-interest,” he said. “When I was very young I used to read things that 
said honesty is the best policy. When I got a bit older, everybody said to me that’s the most 
cynical statement there ever was.” Then he makes his case: 
 
Honesty is something you should pursue whether it’s the best policy or it isn’t the 
best policy. But actually it seems to me that we sometimes forget that it’s not just 
cynicism, that if you have a reputation for good quality, good service, decent 
dealing, bringing out the best in people by real participation, involvement, profit 
sharing, that actually there is not necessarily a conflict between economic interest 
and a sort of moral imperative. I mean, the idea that these two things always have 
to be in conflict seems to be a mistake. 
When people talk about this thing, should we have shareholders or 
stakeholders, I’m afraid I’m a backwoodsman. I say that you cannot look after the 
shareholders’ interests adequately in the longer term without doing all the other 
things right first. If your products are lousy, if your workforce is badly treated, if 
you don’t invest enough for the future, then in no time at all, you’ll have no 
business. You’ll have no profits, you’ll have no business, so that in practice, in the 
real world, the shareholder is already at the end of the queue after the work force 
is properly looked after, after the products have been made acceptable, and after 
sufficient innovation. In the short-term, this isn’t true. 
In the short-term, you can say shareholders must take preference, we’ll 
devalue the product, we’ll cut our R & D, we’ll treat the work force badly, but 
they won’t get away with that very long. One of the things that worries me 
intensely about the U.S./U.K. concern with what all the textbooks call the 
“shareholders’ immediate values” is that this is in conflict with shareholders’ 
long-term ideals. I find that to be a matter of concern. 
. . . . I live in the real world, so if you asked me how I, as an outsider, would 
judge a business’ morals or ethics, I think I’d ask four questions about it. I’d say, 
Are its products and its services sound? Does it invest in the future? Does it build 
its people? And does it behave in the spirit of the law? I think that’s most of what 
you can ask.
37
 
 
Dr. Kenneth R. Andrews, the Donald K. David Professor of Business Administration, 
Emeritus at the Harvard Business School, where he arrived in the late 1940s, is the former editor-
in-chief of the Harvard Business Review and well-known expert on corporate strategy and 
boards of directors. He also is the recent editor of Ethics in Practice: Managing the Moral 
Corporation and has served on numerous corporate boards.
38
 
Professor Andrews finds the topic of the civic responsibilities of institutional investors both 
appealing but complicated, and points to the New Deal era as a time when corporate social 
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responsibility became part of the B-School ethos. Although perhaps surprising to some, this 
consciousness was fostered by a Yankee financier named Philip Cabot who gathered together 
groups of business people for a series of on-campus weekends in what was the precursor to the 
school’s thirteen-week executive session program. 
“Cabot’s very earnest endeavor was to persuade these Roosevelt-haters that the only way to 
save capitalism would be to broaden its agenda to include the welfare of people in society who 
were left out, and so as a sort of liberal strain in the conservative institution, this developed,” 
Andrews explained. “Then Dean David picked this up, having been a corporate executive 
himself and quite an educated person, and made this doctrine more explicit than any subsequent 
dean has done. He carried out the Cabot theme that social responsibility was an integral part of 
the mission of business leaders.” 
Andrews then offers this historic gem about the special nature of the relationship between 
business and society: “This was the origin, actually, of the so-called ‘stakeholders’ long before 
the word stakeholder was used and was elevated into a doctrine. The refrain here was that 
business serves communities other than the shareholders. . . . That’s been almost a trite refrain 
which was obliterated with the rise of financial economics and the return of economic man and 
the takeover movement and so on.”39 
 
Conclusion. The Guiding Light: Implications for Practice 
The paradigm of the corporate covenant carries with it implications for shareholders, boards of 
directors, and management; business education; and public administration and social policy. 
These implications are worth further investigation, analysis, and discussion, but a few are 
mentioned here, keeping in mind that the covenant serves as a North Star, guiding action in a 
positive direction yet also serving as an operative foundation for individual and institutional 
behavior. 
Institutional owners need to understand the powerful opportunity they have to influence 
corporate decision making and reduce public cynicism surrounding corporate behavior. Owners 
also need to understand the responsibilities they carry for positively influencing public life, and 
take action accordingly. This does not mean that the role of government or private voluntary 
activity are supplanted; nor does it mean that government step in and determine what 
corporations should contribute and under what conditions. It does mean that institutional owners, 
cognizant of the multiple needs of their constituencies, endow corporations with the burden 
borne by public and nonprofit sectors in discharging their civic obligations through whatever 
means considered to be appropriate. 
 
Owners as Citizens 
Owners need to map out an agenda that integrates their profit-making objectives with their 
aspirations for a decent life. Thus does this revitalized, principled ownership agenda serve as a 
call to action for corporate strategy and practice. 
Bob Monks puts it this way: “There ought to be a course on ownership and basic corporate 
structure, on what it means. You ought to go back and look at history, and make very clear that 
ownerships are responsibilities. It isn't just a right to be exercised or not exercised. It's a 
responsibility. If you're going to be in a position of being in a society that gives you pieces of 
paper for being a generally passive owner, you have to be active insofar as to be damn sure that 
the responsibilities are being coped with by somebody.” 
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A major expression of responsibility is for institutional owners to try and identify their 
central principles—that is, not only to be clear about acceptable and unacceptable economic 
values and financial performance criteria, but also to assert the kind of society they want to live 
in and, from that, the civic moral values deemed to be important. As per the suggestion made by 
Sir Adrian Cadbury, owners should also include in their annual reports a statement of these 
values, what these values mean in operational terms, and how their investments measure up. 
Equity owners need to recognize that they are both investors and citizens (in addition, some may 
be employees), in a position to insist on the best performance their company is capable of giving, 
not just for the bottom line but for a better world. They are beneficiaries of both. 
How is this done? What is the best way of managing the tension between abstract moral 
principles and concrete corporate strategies? How do owners revitalize their agenda? The first 
step is for them to determine what is truly important, in the larger scheme of things, to them as 
investors and as citizens. This involves a thoughtful and critical conversation about what a “good 
society” means to them, as well as elucidation of the virtues and conditions which help to 
advance or impede its realization. While consensus is highly unlikely, such reflective dialogue 
can begin to illuminate certain inalienable truths upon which human dignity and freedom rest. 
They become, as it were, first order principles. 
A second step is to be prepared to commit corporate resources, in the best judgment of a 
company's board and managers, to actions which promote rather than contradict or subvert these 
principles. This could mean that joint ventures are carried out with other institutional partners—
profit and nonprofit—oriented to alleviating social ails or enhancing the public good. It could 
mean that employees are supported in various community service endeavors. Or, technology, 
research, and medicine might be made available in special life-saving or life-enhancing “pools” 
in an effort to tackle seemingly intractable problems. Higher levels of corporate pretax profits 
could be allocated to philanthropic projects; the current average level of charitable giving is 
woefully low (less than 20 percent of allowable deductions) and, because of falling revenues and 
attitudes of CEOs, many companies have decreased their charitable giving, as described earlier 
in this text. Or, it could mean that attention is given to the allocation of a percentage of sales 
(rather than pretax profits) to philanthropic enterprises, as Patagonia does. 
These are proactive, affirmative measures. However, a threshold concern is avoiding civic 
harm. Owners need to give attention to how a corporation might bear the cost of its 
“externalities,” a phenomenon outlined by Bob Monks in his musings on the matter. Society 
should not be responsible for cleaning up a company's deliberate mess. 
There are many other strategic possibilities for a revitalized ownership agenda, limited only 
by imagination, level of courage, and grasp of socio-political and economic realities. The point 
here is that owners view the corporation in which they hold equity as an extension of their 
community, not as something separate from it. As far-flung and worldwide as corporate 
operations might be, and whatever the terms of their profitability, they do not exist in a vacuum; 
at a minimum, owners need to assure that society does not pay a price for their own gain. More 
desirable is owner commitment to corporate pursuit of community-enhancing aims. 
One scenario: If owners consider a “good society” or “democratic society” to be important, 
then they need to identify the first order principles or requirements of this society. “Freedom” 
and “prosperity” are typically deemed central values. In beneficiary terms, these values are 
reinforced when return on investment is high, because this translates into dividends or capital 
appreciation, which in turn provide the financial resources and security necessary to social 
independence. 
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But in addition to earnings, freedom and prosperity also can be translated into a number of 
positive initiatives a company could support. Here are three examples. 
 
Education 
Functional illiteracy contributes to bondage and has a detrimental effect on society; it weakens 
the opportunities for a good life and undermines the democratic apparatus. Universal education 
contributes to individual freedom and societal well-being. Thus could companies put their clout 
behind public education, both elementary / secondary and postsecondary. The red herring here is 
“free choice,” a cry for quality that finds its roots in desperation, giving rise to separatist forms 
that are unequal, indeed. 
 
Emerging Democracies 
Emerging democracies run the risk of collapsing, because democracy is not edible; needed is 
support in at least three areas: (1) economic development; (2) metropolitan approaches to urban 
government in developing countries facing massive immigration and demographic growth; and 
(3) organizations that contribute to the cultivation of a civil society. These include emerging 
businesses and nongovernmental organizations, especially in places like Africa and the former 
Soviet Union where the seeds of democracy have been sown, yet face perilous winds.40 Indeed, 
much is to be learned in those countries throwing off the shackles of oppressive structures; 
possibly to emerge are social and economic systems which combine the best of capitalism and 
compassion. 
 
The City 
Besot with a rising tide of crime, youth anger and alienation, immigration, fiscal stress and 
economic hardship, our nation's cities are in desperate need of rejuvenation, lest we find 
ourselves with Third World conditions within our own borders. In April 1992, Los Angeles 
warned us once again, just as we were reminded twenty-six years ago when violence erupted in 
the urban core, that we have the potential in our cities for creating civil war—a far cry from the 
civitas upon which our democracy depends. We need to rededicate ourselves to the proposition 
that as go the cities, so goes America, and that the time has come to place our civic ideal and our 
urban condition foursquare on the public agenda. Rather than fleeing cities, corporations need to 
fortify them, helping to restore the balance between self-interest and the public interest, a moral 
question, according to that great urbanist Paul Ylvisaker, “which every philosopher of the City 
has raised, beginning with Plato and St. Augustine. None of us will fully resolve this, but we will 
kill the city's soul if we stop trying.”41 
Other first order principles of an ownership agenda affecting the quality of urban life might 
include “justice” and “fairness.” “Human and ecologic dignity” are other values that can find 
expression in a myriad of programs and policies designed to empower and enlighten individuals 
and communities as well as insure environmental safeguards and prosperity. Corporate initiatives 
promoting these values—such as equitable capital lending initiatives and practices within 
minority neighborhoods, support for violence prevention and alternative dispute resolution 
programs, and community economic development in the nation's inner cities—come to mind. 
Here, too, the possibilities are endless. 
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Corporate Governance 
Boards of Directors 
Boards of directors need to understand how they mediate the financial and nonfinancial values of 
the shareholders they represent with the mission and reality of corporate life. Implied here is not 
just financial and business savvy, which are critical preconditions. Needed, too, is an 
understanding of the root values which animate policy and practice and a capacity to envision 
future corporate and civic scenarios, matched with a pragmatic recognition of the limits as well 
as possibilities of the firm's reciprocal obligations. A critical component is some form of board-
level orientation and training, particularly in the overlapping areas of business and values; 
remarkably enough, very little in the way of board education is done, particularly for “outside” 
directors who are less familiar with the internal workings of the company, and for “internal” 
directors who perhaps may lack an understanding of some of the cultural and political forces at 
work which affect corporate success. There are exciting opportunities here for creative and 
substantive work; organized religion in the various faith traditions—both with their teachings on 
wealth, power, and private property, as well as with the role of churches as shareholder 
activists—has much to contribute in shedding light on the terrain. 
Along these lines, board members need to be independent so that their judgment is not 
unduly impaired by corporate self-interest. In part, this independence comes from non-executive 
status, a diverse range of backgrounds and viewpoints, limits on other corporate board 
participation, and limits on the number of terms held. Finally, a board needs to be responsive to 
and representative of the shareholders it serves. This sensitivity can be achieved through 
constituent-specific means, as in union board representation previously described, or generically, 
as in greater board participation of women and people of color. 
Under the covenant and as stewards, the board is responsible for not only a company's fiscal 
fitness but also for the responsible discharge of its civic duty. Stewardship, then, becomes 
connected to public service, a powerful expansion of the fiduciary ethic that represents a return 
to historical beginnings. Under the covenant and as a fiduciary, a board also bears responsibility 
for the unnecessary financial and social costs of corporate decision making and needs to make 
sure that these costs are not unfairly distributed throughout society, borne by those least able to 
cope. Thus boards become the trustees of corporate goodness, this time measured, as Monks 
would say, in different cost/benefit calculations. 
 
Chief Executive Officers, Managers, and Employees 
Chief executive officers, managers, and employees need to receive the incentives, support, and 
recognition for devising creative ways in which the public benefits of corporate behavior can 
accrue without undermining its profitability, performance, and quality. As companies adopt 
different (albeit not new) approaches to work organization—such as total quality management or 
entrepreneurialism—so as to increase productivity and boost profits, they also can incorporate a 
values approach to management and good citizenship goals in keeping with the covenantal 
standard. 
Many firms already have volunteer programs or corporate philanthropic structures. In 
addition to more aggressive support of these undertakings, managers and employees should be 
encouraged and rewarded for developing other imaginative strategies for fulfilling the covenantal 
standard. Because this standard is rooted in a firm's values and ethical conduct, as well as its 
ideal scenario of the future, these “public good” strategies should represent a coherent 
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complement to business strategies rather than a stepchild or antagonist to them. 
Nota bene: Much has been written about the importance of the chief executive officer in 
shaping corporate culture, as well as the need for modeling good judgment and business acumen. 
Although companies still may be caught in the grip of a green eyeshade approach to corporate 
affairs, attention should be paid to how those humanistic qualities or habits of the heart exhibited 
by CEOs and senior management add value to a company's performance. They help constitute 
the moral template with which corporate decisions are made and directions charted. Valid here 
are not only the usual requisites of leadership, but the ability to inspire and communicate the 
interdependency of corporate and civic prosperity. We need statesmen, not mandarins or 
philosopher kings, in the corporate upper echelons. 
 
Business Education 
Business education, by extension, needs more fully to accept the curricular contribution of the 
liberal arts and humanities as well as service learning. It also needs to get away from overly 
technical and fragmented course offerings and opt more for integrated, holistic approaches to 
knowledge, competence building, and problem solving that look more like the real world. 
(Indeed, higher education in general needs to pursue this route, lest it run the risk of being 
obsolete, a 19th century relic in 21st century times.) 
Be it undergraduate or graduate level, programs in business administration play an important 
role in equipping future business leaders to strike a better balance between self-interest and the 
common-wealth. Along with the recent resurgence of interest in community service, buttressed 
by the recent signing of the National and Community Service Trust Act of 1993 which further 
promotes school-based and community-based service learning programs, the opportunities for 
refashioning business education according to the covenantal paradigm are exciting, indeed.
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One campus that is embracing this reality is Babson College in Wellesley, Massachusetts. 
Named again by U.S. News & World Report as the country's number one undergraduate school in 
a “specialty” category, Babson is carrying out several unique initiatives designed to equip its 
students to balance business and citizenship objectives. For example, the Freshman Management 
Experience, a one-year pilot program for eighty students, seeks to integrate several business skill 
areas (including general management, entrepreneurial studies, and management information 
systems) with corporate civic responsibility and community service. 
In addition to learning basic business skills, students are expected during the first semester 
to develop (on a competitive team basis) a business plan and community service project. 
Following a several stage judging process, students are expected to implement the winning 
business plans during the second semester, with the profits from it (if there are profits) used to 
sustain the community service project.
43
 
For many years, Babson has offered a strong program in liberal arts and the humanities. 
With initial support from the National Endowment of the Humanities, since 1985 it has run a 
cross-disciplinary approach called the Cluster Program. The Cluster Program involves a “set” of 
two or three required first-year courses (one from management, one from liberal arts, and one in 
either writing or speech communication) which come together to explore topics that involve 
questions of fundamental values. Examples of cluster configurations include the concept of law 
and nature in society; the civic responsibility of the corporation; the concept of “value” in 
accounting, history, and literature; the notion of “success” in America; and cultural mythologies 
and the law.
44
 
Babson also offers a course on philanthropy and voluntarism, with students expected to 
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serve at least four hours per week in a community service setting. [Full disclosure: I teach that 
course.] Efforts are currently under way, with the leadership of the schools volunteer center, to 
broaden curricular inclusion of service learning as a way of building character and leadership 
potential.
45
 
Another important model for thinking about the covenantal standard and business education, 
this time at the graduate school and professional level, is the Joint Project for Business, Values, 
and the Economy at the Harvard Divinity School and the Harvard Business School. Now in its 
third year, the aim of this project, according to Divinity School Dean Ronald F. Thiemann, is to 
explore intersecting interests in the business and theological communities and possibly to 
discover a common language, vision, and mission. The project includes academics and 
practitioners from the world of business and the world of religion and thus far has set a dialogue 
in motion as well as concentrated specifically on issues of mutual interest, such as the papal 
encyclical on the economy, manufacturing plant closings, corporate executive leadership, 
corporate activity in South Africa, and the role of television in shaping national values.
46
 
 
Public Administration and Social Policy 
Public administration and social policy, similarly affected by the covenantal paradigm, are called 
upon to adopt a more values-based and comprehensive approach. Taken together, these fields are 
relative newcomers on the professional practice front; each, like most professions, has suffered 
from problems of definition and standard setting, often emulating the investigative and 
quantitative methods and measures of other, more “respectable” realms such as science or 
mathematics. Indeed, a case could be made that public administration and social policy are 
derivative things, having no theory or methodology of their own but relying upon other 
disciplines for their process and substance. 
But another way of thinking about public administration and social policy is to see them as 
the crossroads where fact and value collide. The challenge is to figure out how to avoid injury 
and pose the question, What are public administration and social policy trying to accomplish? 
The answer to this takes one irrevocably into covenantal territory, wherein civic moral values 
reside. Yet both fields tend to bypass this area, considering it too volatile, ambiguous, or emotive 
for concrete decision making. Because policy choices and their execution are based upon beliefs, 
reason, and political compromise (over multiple, vague, and often conflicting goals), there often 
is little room for considering the transcendent call of the covenant in a world characterized by 
trade-offs among competing aims. 
Yet nothing could be more important. This article has been devoted to the proposition that 
the corporation, as a profit-making enterprise, has an obligation to give something back to 
society in exchange for its right to exist. Whatever the ideology that determines the legitimacy of 
this proposition, or the manner in which it becomes real, the basic idea is that no one sector or 
institution should bear the complete burden of contributing to a good society. Presumably this is 
the central purpose of public administration and social policy: to improve the general welfare. 
The degree to which professionals in these areas know about corporate governance and the 
history of the corporation could help to determine their success in achieving this purpose. 
While the American debate over social welfare choices continues—over matters such as the 
role of government, the organization and provision of social services, the distribution and 
allocation of resources, desirable outcomes and consequences, or planned change like that being 
undertaken with health care—missing from the dialogic framework is the corporate link. To be 
sure, terms like “business partnerships” or even “privatization” pepper the rhetorical and 
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program landscape, yet they tend to represent an accommodation to the shortcomings of the 
public sector rather than a hearty acceptance of civic responsibility. And, they tend to be episodic 
and temporary in their use; major exceptions are places like Minneapolis/St. Paul where the 
corporate civic sense is high. 
That this is a missing link is understandable, given the high level of public cynicism 
surrounding the view of a corporation as a moral actor. However, a revitalized and principled 
ownership agenda that mixes doing well and doing good into a declaration of purpose can make 
a major impact on how we think about the management of public affairs and the shaping of 
social policy. Ultimately, policy making, be it public or private, clarifies areas of disagreement 
and crystallizes the choices we must make. Without being ensnared by process (the means by 
which policy is enacted needs to remain subordinate to the purpose that is trying to be achieved, 
a lesson all-too-often forgotten in a land where technical virtuosity or special interest groups 
reign supreme), everyone who is engaged in public administration and social policy would do 
well to freshen their vision and consider how claims to public and private prosperity can be 
joined together. 
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New York Court of Appeals provided its now classic formulation of the “prudent man” rule in King v. Talbot, 4 N.Y. 
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which did not anticipate the size of current pension funds and as currently interpreted and applied, provides excessive 
limits on the flow of capital, thereby impeding profit realization. “The objective is to remove obstacles for creativity 
and to enable investment capital to flow into areas where opportunity and need combine to suggest a potential for 
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“Reckless Prudence: Investment of Pension Fund Assets in the United States of America,” Monks said, “America has 
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